Lattice-based Unidirectional IBPRE Secure in Standard Model by Dutta, Priyanka et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
06
74
1v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
4 M
ay
 20
20
Lattice-based Unidirectional IBPRE Secure in
Standard Model
Priyanka Dutta, Willy Susilo, Dung Hoang Duong, Joonsang Baek, and
Partha Sarathi Roy
Institute of Cybersecurity and Cryptology
School of Computing and Information Technology
University of Wollongong
Northfields Avenue, Wollongong NSW 2522, Australia
{pdutta,wsusilo,hduong,baek,partha}@uow.edu.au
Abstract. Proxy re-encryption (PRE) securely enables the re-encryption of ciphertexts from one
key to another, without relying on trusted parties, i.e., it offers delegation of decryption rights.
PRE allows a semi-trusted third party termed as a “proxy” to securely divert encrypted files of
user A (delegator) to user B (delegatee) without revealing any information about the underlying
files to the proxy. To eliminate the necessity of having a costly certificate verification process,
Green and Ateniese introduced an identity-based PRE (IB-PRE). The potential applicability of
IB-PRE leads to intensive research from its first instantiation. Unfortunately, till today, there is
no unidirectional IB-PRE secure in the standard model, which can withstand quantum attack. In
this paper, we provide, for the first time, a concrete construction of unidirectional IB-PRE which
is secure in standard model based on the hardness of learning with error problem. Our technique is
to use the novel trapdoor delegation technique of Micciancio and Peikert. The way we use trapdoor
delegation technique may prove useful for functionalities other than proxy re-encryption as well.
1 Introduction
Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [5] introduced the concept of Proxy Re-encryption (PRE)
towards an efficient solution that offers delegation of decryption rights without com-
promising privacy. PRE allows a semi-trusted third party, called a proxy, to securely
divert encrypted files of one user (delegator) to another user (delegatee). The proxy,
however, cannot learn the underlying message m, and thus both parties’ privacy can
be maintained. This primitive (and its variants) have various applications ranging from
encrypted email forwarding [5], securing distributed file systems [4], to digital rights
management systems.In addition application-driven purposes, various works have shown
connections between re-encryption with other cryptographic primitives, such as program
obfuscation [14,9,8] and fully-homomorphic encryption [7]. Thus studies along this line
are both important and interesting for theory and practice.
PRE systems are classified as unidirectional and bidirectional based on the direc-
tion of delegation. It is worth mentioning that the unidirectional constructions are much
desirable because bidirectional construction easily implementable using a unidirectional
one. Though the concept of PRE was initiated in [5], the first unidirectional PRE pro-
posed by Ateniese et al. in [4], where following desired properties of a PRE are listed:
Non-interactivity (re-encryption key, rkA→B, can be generated by A alone using B’s pub-
lic key; no trusted authority is needed); Proxy transparency (neither the delegator nor
the delegatees are aware of the presence of a proxy); Key optimality (the size of B’s
secret key remains constant, regardless of how many delegations he accepts); Collusion
resilience (it is computationally infeasible for the coalition of the proxy and user B to
compute As secret key); Non-transitivity (it should be hard for the proxy to re-delegate
the decryption right, namely to compute rkA→C from rkA→B, rkB→C). To achieve the
aforementioned properties (partially) with improved security guarantee, there are elegant
followup works which can be found in [6,14,17,9,8]. For quantum-safe version of PRE,
Gentry [11] mentioned the feasibility of unidirectional PRE through fully homomorphic
encryption scheme (FHE). However, FHE costs huge computation. Xagawa proposed
construction of PRE in [25], but the construction lacks concrete security analysis. Fur-
ther development of lattice-based PRE can be found in [16,8,21,10].
Certificate management problem is a crucial issue in the PKI based schemes. This
crucial issue was addressed by Green et al. [13] in the area of PRE. For lattice-based
construction, Singh et al. [23] proposed a bidirectional identity-based PRE. However, it
is required to use secret key of both delegator and delegatee to generate re-encryption
key, which lacks one of the fundamental properties of PRE. Further, they proposed
unidirectional identity-based PRE [24], termed as IB-uPRE, secure in the random oracle
model. However, the size of re-encrypted ciphertext blows up than the original encrypted
one. Moreover, the schemes encrypt the message bit by bit. Later, there are some further
attempts to construct lattice-based identity-based PRE, which are flawed1 [15,26].
Our Contribution and Technique: It is an interesting open research problem to con-
struct post-quantum secure IB-uPRE in the standard model. In this paper, we resolve this
daunting task by constructing a concrete scheme based on the hardness of learning with
error (LWE) problem. The proposed construction is capable of encrypting multi-bit mes-
sage and enjoy the properties like non-interactivity, proxy transparency, key optimality,
non-transitivity along with other properties follow generically from IB-PRE. To construct
the IB-uPRE, we start with the construction of the identity-based encryption scheme by
Agrawal et al. [1]. In non-interactive IB-uPRE, it is required to construct re-encryption
key by the delegator alone. One of the feasible ways to adopt the non-interactive feature
is to provide a trapdoor to the delegator as a secret key. But, this technique is not sup-
ported by the design of [1]. In [1], the trapdoor is the master secret key and the secret
key of user is sampled by the master secret key. We first trace the design of selective
IBE, where the secret key of a user is also a trapdoor, by using the trapdoor delegation
technique of [18]. Then extend the design to incorporate re-encryption feature based
on the encryption scheme of [18]. Here, the secret key of a user is a tuple of trapdoor,
where one is used for decryption and another one is used for re-encryption key (ReKey)
generation. ReKey is generated as in [16,10] with a trick to resists proxy to get any
1 In [15], authors claimed to proof IND-ID-CPA, but provide the proof for IND-CPA. In [26], authors assumed
a universally known entity (G matrix; see section 2.1) as a secret entity.
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information regarding the underlying message of the corresponding re-encrypted cipher-
text.. The underlying IBE of the proposed IB-uPRE may prove useful to design expressive
cryptographic primitives other than identity-based proxy re-encryption as well.
2 Preliminaries
We denote the real numbers and the integers by R,Z, respectively. We denote column-
vectors by lower-case bold letters (e.g. b), so row-vectors are represented via transposition
(e.g. bt). Matrices are denoted by upper-case bold letters and treat a matrix X inter-
changeably with its ordered set {x1,x2, . . .} of column vectors. We use I for the identity
matrix and 0 for the zero matrix, where the dimension will be clear from context. We use
[∗|∗] to denote the concatenation of vectors or matrices. A negligible function, denoted
generically by negl(n). We say that a probability is overwhelming if it is 1 − negl(n).
The statistical distance between two distributions X and Y over a countable domain Ω
defined as 1
2
∑
w∈Ω |Pr[X = w]−Pr[Y = w]|. We say that a distribution over Ω is ǫ-far if
its statistical distance from the uniform distribution is at most ǫ. Throughout the paper,
r = ω(
√
log n) represents a fixed function which will be approximated by
√
ln(2n/ǫ)/π.
2.1 Lattices
A lattice Λ is a discrete additive subgroup of Rm. Specially, a lattice Λ in Rm with
basis B = [b1, · · · ,bn] ∈ Rm×n, where each bi is written in column form, is defined as
Λ := {∑ni=1 bixi|xi ∈ Z ∀i = 1, . . . , n} ⊆ Rm. We call n the rank of Λ and if n = m we
say that Λ is a full rank lattice. The dual lattice Λ∗ is the set of all vectors y ∈ Rm
satisfying 〈x,y〉 ∈ Z for all vectors x ∈ Λ. If B is a basis of an arbitrary lattice Λ, then
B∗ = B(BtB)−1 is a basis for Λ∗. For a full-rank lattice, B∗ = B−t.
In this paper, we mainly consider full rank lattices containing qZm, called q-ary
lattices, defined as the following, for a given matrix A ∈ Zn×mq and u ∈ Znq : Λ⊥(A) :=
{z ∈ Zm : Az = 0mod q}; Λ(At) = {z ∈ Zm : ∃ s ∈ Znq s.t. z = Atsmod q}; Λ⊥u (A) :=
{z ∈ Zm : Az = umod q} = Λ⊥(A) + x for x ∈ Λ⊥(A). Note that, Λ⊥(A) and Λ(At)
are dual lattices, up to a q scaling factor: qΛ⊥(A)∗ = Λ(At), and vice-versa. Sometimes
we consider the non-integral, 1-ary lattice 1
q
Λ(At) = Λ⊥(A)∗ ⊇ Zm.
Gaussian on Lattices: Let Λ ⊆ Zm be a lattice. For a vector c ∈ Rm and a positive
parameter s ∈ R, define: ρc,s(x) = exp
(
π ‖x−c‖
2
s2
)
and ρc,s(Λ) =
∑
x∈Λ ρc,s(x). The
discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ with center c and parameter σ is DΛ,c,s(y) =
ρc,s(y)
ρc,s(Λ)
, ∀y ∈ Λ.
Hard problems on Lattices: There are two lattice-based one-way functions associated
with matrix A ∈ Zn×mq for m = poly(n):
– gA(e, s) = s
tA + et mod q for s ∈ Znq and a Gaussian e ∈ Zm and fA(x) = Ax
mod q, for x ∈ Zm;
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– The Learning With Errors (LWE) problem was introduced in [22]. The problem to in-
vert gA(e, s), where e← DZm,αq is known as search-LWEq,n,m,α problem and is as hard
as quantumly solving Shortest Independent Vector Problem (SIVP) on n-dimensional
lattices. The decisional- LWEq,n,m,α problem asks to distinguish the output of gA from
uniform.
– The Small Integer Solution (SIS) problem was first suggested to be hard on average
by Ajtai [2] and then formalized by Micciancio and Regev [20]. Finding a non-zero
short preimage x′ such that fA(x
′) = 0, with ‖x′‖ ≤ β, is an instantiation of the
SISq,n,m,β problem. It is known to be as hard as certain worst-case problems (e.g.
SIVP) in standard lattices [3,20,12,19].
Trapdoors for Lattices: Here, we briefly describe the main results of [18] and it’s
generalized version from [16]: the definition of G-trapdoor, the algorithms InvertO,
SampleO and DelTrapO.
A G-trapdoor is a transformation (represented by a matrix R) from a public matrix
A to a special matrix G which is called as gadget matrix. The formal definitions as
follows:
Definition 1 ([18]). Let A ∈ Zn×mq and G ∈ Zn×wq be matrices with m ≥ w ≥ n. A G-
trapdoor for A is a matrix R ∈ Z(m−w)×w such that A
[
R
I
]
= HG, for some invertible
matrix H ∈ Zn×nq . We refer to H as the tag or label of the trapdoor.
Definition 2 ([16]). The generalized version of a G-trapdoor :
Let A =
[
A0 A1 · · · Ak−1
] ∈ Zn×mq for k ≥ 2, and A0 ∈ Zn×m¯q ,A1, . . . ,Ak−1 ∈ Zn×wq
with m¯ ≥ w ≥ n and m = m¯+ (k − 1) · w (typically, w = n⌈log q⌉). A G-trapdoor for
A is a sequence of matrices R =
[
R1 R2 · · ·Rk−1
] ∈ Zm¯×(k−1)wq such that :
[
A0 A1 · · · Ak−1
]


R1 R2 · · · Rk−1
I 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · I

 =
[
H1G H2G · · ·Hk−1G
]
,
for invertible matrices Hi ∈ Zn×nq and a fixed G ∈ Zn×wq .
InvertO(R,A,b,Hi) [16]: On input a vector b
t = stA+ et, a matrix
A =
[
A0 −A0R1 +H1G · · · −A0Rk−1 +Hk−1G
]
and its corresponding G-trapdoor
R =
[
R1 R2 · · · Rk−1
]
with invertible tag Hi, the algorithm first computes
b′ = bt


R1 R2 · · ·Rk−1
I 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · I


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and then run the inverting oracle O(b′) for G to get (s′, e′). The algorithm outputs s =
H−1i s
′ and e = b−Ats. Note that, InvertO produces correct output if e ∈ P1/2(q ·B−t),
where B is a basis of Λ⊥(G); cf. [18, Theorem 5.4].
SampleO(R,A,H,u, s) [18]: On input (R,A′,H,u, s), the algorithm construct A =[
A′ −A′R+HG], where R is the G-trapdoor for matrix A with invertible tag H and
u ∈ Znq .The algorithm outputs, using an oracle O for Gaussian sampling over a desired
coset Λ⊥v (G), a vector drawn from a distribution within negligible statistical distance of
DΛ⊥
u
(A),s. To sample a Gaussian vector x ∈ Zmq for A =
[
A0 A1 · · · Ak−1
] ∈ Zn×mq with
the generalized trapdoor R =
[
R1 R2 · · · Rk−1
]
and k − 1 invertible Hi’s given a coset
u ∈ Znq , use generalized version of SampleO from [16].
DelTrapO (A′ =
[
A A1
]
,R,H′, s)[18]: On input an oracle O for discrete Gaussian
sampling over cosets of Λ = Λ⊥(A) with parameter s, an extended matrix A′ of A, an
invertible matrix H′, the algorithm will sample (using O) each column of R′ indepen-
dently from a discrete Gaussian with parameter s over the appropriate coset of Λ⊥(A),
so that AR′ = H′G−A1. The algorithm outputs a trapdoor R′ for A′ with tag H′.
2.2 Identity-Based Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption
Definition 3 (Identity-Based Unidirectional Proxy ReEncryption (IB-uPRE)
[13]). A unidirectional Identity-Based Proxy Re-Encryption (IB-uPRE) scheme is a tuple
of algorithms (SetUp,Extract,ReKeyGen,Enc,ReEnc,Dec) :
– (PP,msk)←− SetUp(1n) : On input the security parameter 1n, the setup algorithm
outputs PP,msk.
– skid ←− Extract(PP,msk, id) : On input an identity id, public parameter PP, mas-
ter secret key, output the secret key skid for id.
– rki→j ←− ReKeyGen(PP, skidi, idi, idj) : On input a public parameter PP , secret
key skidi of a delegator i, and idi, idj, output a unidirectional re-encryption key rki→j.
– ct←− Enc(PP, id,m) : On input an identity id, public parameter PP and a plaintext
m ∈M, output a ciphertext ct under the specified identity id.
– ct′ ←− ReEnc(PP, rki→j, ct) : On input a ciphertext ct under the identity i and a
re-encryption key rki→j, output a ciphertext ct
′ under the identity j.
– m←− Dec(PP, skidi, ct) : On input the ciphertext ct under the identity i and secret
key skidi of i, the algorithm outputs a plaintext m or the error symbol ⊥.
An Identity-Based Proxy Re-Encryption scheme is called single-hop if a ciphertext can
be re-encrypted only once. In a multi-hop setting proxy can apply further re-encryptions
to already re-encrypted ciphertext.
Definition 4 (Single-hop IB-uPRE Correctness). A single-hop unidirectional Identity-
Based Proxy Re-Encryption scheme (SetUp,Extract,ReKeyGen,Enc,ReEnc,Dec)
decrypts correctly for the plaintext space M if :
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– For all skid output by Extract under id and for all m ∈M,
it holds that Dec(PP, skid,Enc(PP, id,m)) = m.
– For any re-encryption key rki→j output by ReKeyGen(PP, skidi, idi, idj) and any
ct = Enc(PP, idi, m) it holds that Dec(PP, skidj ,ReEnc(PP, rki→j, ct)) = m.
Security Game of Unidirectional Selective Identity-Based Proxy Re-Encryption
Scheme against Chosen Plaintext Attack (IND-sID-CPA) :
To describe the security model we first classify all of the users into honest (HU) and
corrupted (CU). In the honest case an adversary does not know secret key, whereas
for a corrupted user the adversary has secret key. Let A be the PPT adversary and
Π = (SetUp,Extract,ReKeyGen, Enc,ReEnc,Dec) be an IB-uPRE scheme with a
plaintext space M and a ciphertext space C. Let id∗(∈ HU) be the target user. Security
game is defined according to the following game ExpIND-sID-CPAA (1
n) :
1. SetUp: The challenger runs SetUp(1n) to get (PP,msk) and give PP to A.
2. Phase 1: The adversary A may make quires polynomially many times in any order
to the following oracles:
– OExtract: an oracle that on input id ∈ CU , output skid; Otherwise, output ⊥.
– OReKeyGen: an oracle that on input the identities of i-th and j-th users: if idi ∈
HU \ {id∗}, idj ∈ HU or idi, idj ∈ CU or idi ∈ CU, idj ∈ HU , output rki→j;
otherwise, output ⊥.
– OReEnc: an oracle that on input the identities of i, j-th users and ciphertext of i-th
user: if idi, idj ∈ HU or idi, idj ∈ CU or idi ∈ CU, idj ∈ HUoutput re-encrypted
ciphertext; otherwise, output ⊥.
3. Challenge: A outputs two messages m0, m1 ∈M and is given a challenge ciphertext
ctb ←− Enc(PP, id∗, mb) for either b = 0 or b = 1.
4. Phase 2: After receiving the challenge ciphertext, A continues to have access to the
OExtract, OReKeyGen and OReEnc oracle as in Phase 1.
5. ODecision: On input b′ from adversaryA, this oracle outputs 1 if b = b′ and 0 otherwise.
The advantage of an adversary in the above experiment ExpIND-sID-CPAA (1
n) is defined as
|Pr[b′ = b]− 1
2
|.
Definition 5. An IB-uPRE scheme is IND-sID-CPA secure if all PPT adversaries A have
at most a negligible advantage in experiment ExpIND-sID-CPAA (1
n).
Remark 1. In [13], ReKeyGen query is allowed from id∗ to HU to make the IB-uPRE
collusion resilient (coalition of malicious proxy and delegetee to compute delegators se-
cret key). Here, we have blocked ReKeyGen query from id∗ to HU and the proposed
IB-uPRE scheme is not claimed to be collusion resilient.
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3 Single-hop Identity-Based Unidirectional Proxy
Re-Encryption Scheme (IB-uPRE)
3.1 Construction of Single-hop IB-uPRE
In this section, we present our construction of single-hop IB-uPRE. We set the parameters
as the following.
– G ∈ Zn×nkq is a gadget matrix for large enough prime power q = pe = poly(n) and
k = O(log q) = O(logn), so there are efficient algorithms to invert gG and to sample
for fG.
– m¯ = O(nk) and the Gaussian D = Dm¯×nk
Z,r , so that (A¯, A¯R) is negl(n)-far from
uniform for A¯.
– the LWE error rate α for IB-uPRE should satisfy 1/α = O(nk)3 · r3.
To start out, we first recall encoding techniques from [18,1].
– Message Encoding: In the proposed construction, message space is M = {0, 1}nk.
M map bijectively to the cosets of Λ/2Λ for Λ = Λ(Gt) by some function encode
that is efficient to evaluate and invert. In particular, letting E ∈ Znk×nk be any basis
of Λ, we can map m ∈ {0, 1}nk to encode(m)= Em ∈ Znk [18].
– Encoding of Identity: In the following construction, we use full-rank difference
map (FRD) as in [1]. FRD: Znq → Zn×nq ; id 7→ Hid. We assume identities are non-zero
elements in Znq . The set of identities can be expanded to {0, 1}∗ by hashing identities
into Znq using a collision resistant hash. FRD satisfies the following properties: 1.
∀ distinct id1, id2 ∈ Znq , the matrix Hid1−Hid2 ∈ Zn×nq is full rank; 2. ∀ id ∈ Znq \{0},
the matrix Hid ∈ Zn×nq is full rank; 3. FRD is computable in polynomial time (in
n log q).
The proposed IB-uPRE consists of the following algorithms:
SetUp(1n) : On input a security parameter n, do:
1. Choose A¯← Zn×m¯q , R← D, and set A¯′ = −A¯R ∈ Zn×nkq .
2. Choose four invertible matrices H1,H2,H3,H4 at uniformly random from Z
n×n
q .
3. Choose two random matrices A1,A2 from Z
n×nk
q .
4. Output PP = (A¯, A¯′,A1,A2,H1,H2,H3,H4,G) and the master secret key is msk =
R.
Extract(PP,msk, id) : On input a public parameter PP , master secret key msk and
the identity of i-th user idi, do:
1. Construct A˜i =
[
A¯ A¯′+HidiG
]
=
[
A¯ −A¯R+HidiG
] ∈ Zn×mq , where m = m¯+ nk.
So, R is a trapdoor of A˜i with tag Hidi .
2. – Construct Ai1 = A1 +H3HidiG ∈ Zn×nkq and set A′i1 =
[
A˜i Ai1
] ∈ Zn×(m+nk)q .
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– Call the algorithm DelTrapO(A′i1,R,H1, s) to get a trapdoor Ri1 ∈ Zm×nk for
A′i1 with tag H1 ∈ Zn×nq , where s ≥ ηǫ(Λ⊥(A˜i)), so that A˜iRi1 = H1G−Ai1.
3. – Construct Ai2 = A2 +H4HidiG ∈ Zn×nkq and set A′i2 =
[
A˜i Ai2
] ∈ Zn×(m+nk)q .
– Call the algorithm DelTrapO(A′i2,R,H2, s) to get a trapdoor Ri2 ∈ Zm×nk for
A′i2 with tag H2 ∈ Zn×nq , so that A˜iRi2 = H2G−Ai2.
Output the secret key as skidi =
[
Ri1 Ri2
] ∈ Zm×2nk. Notice that,
[
A˜i Ai1 Ai2
]

Ri1 Ri2I 0
0 I

 = [H1G H2G] .
Enc(PP, idi,m ∈ {0, 1}nk) : On input a public parameter PP , the identity of i-th user
idi and message m ∈ {0, 1}nk, do:
1. Construct A˜i =
[
A¯ −A¯R+HidiG
] ∈ Zn×mq .
2. Construct Ai1,Ai2 for idi same as in Extract algorithm and set Ai =
[
A˜i Ai1 Ai2
]
.
3. Choose a uniformly random s← Znq .
4. Sample error vectors e¯0 ← Dm¯Z,αq and e′0, e1, e2 ← DnkZ,s′, where s′2 = (‖e¯0‖2 +
m¯(αq)2)r2. Let the error vector e = (e0, e1, e2) ∈ Zm¯+nk × Znk × Znk, where e0 =
(e¯0, e
′
0) ∈ Zm¯ × Znk.
5. Compute bt = (b0,b1,b2) = 2(s
tAi mod q)+e
t+(0, 0, encode(m)t) mod 2q, where
the first zero vector has dimension m¯ + nk, the second has dimension nk and b0 =
(b¯0,b
′
0).
6. Output the ciphertext ct = b ∈ Zm¯+3nk2q .
Dec(PP, skidi, ct) : On input a public parameter PP , the secret key of i-th user skidi
and ciphertext ct, do:
1. If ct has invalid form or Hidi = 0, output ⊥. Otherwise,
– Construct A˜i =
[
A¯ −A¯R+HidiG
] ∈ Zn×mq .
– ConstructAi1,Ai2 for idi same as inExtract algorithm and setAi =
[
A˜i Ai1 Ai2
]
.
2. Call InvertO(
[
Ri1 Ri2
]
,Ai,b,H2) to get values z ∈ Znq and e = (e0, e1, e2) ∈
Z
m¯+nk × Znk × Znk, where e0 = (e¯0, e′0) ∈ Zm¯ × Znk for which bt = ztAi + et
mod q. If the call to Invert fails for any reason, output ⊥.
3. If ‖e¯0‖ ≥ αq
√
m¯ or ‖e′0‖ ≥ αq
√
2m¯nk · r or ‖ej‖ ≥ αq
√
2m¯nk · r for j = 1, 2, output
⊥.
4. Let V = b − e mod 2q, parsed as V = (V0,V1,V2) ∈ Zm¯+nk2q × Znk2q × Znk2q , where
V0 = (V0,V
′
0) ∈ Zm¯2q × Znk2q . If V0 /∈ 2Λ(A¯t), output ⊥.
5. Output encode−1(Vt

Ri1 Ri2I 0
0 I

 mod 2q) ∈ {0, 1}nk if it exists, otherwise output ⊥.
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ReKeyGen(PP, skidi, idi, idj) : On input a public parameter PP , the secret key of i-th
user skidi and identity of j-th user idj , do:
1. Construct Ai =
[
A˜i Ai1 Ai2
]
, where A˜i =
[
A¯ A¯′+HidiG
]
and Ai1,Ai2 are same as
in Extract algorithm .
2. Construct Aj =
[
A˜j Aj1 Aj2
]
, where A˜j =
[
A¯ A¯′+HidjG
]
and Aj1,Aj2 are same
as in Extract algorithm .
3. Using SampleO with trapdoor Ri1(from the secret key of ith user ), with tag H1, we
sample from the cosets which are formed with the column of the matrix A¯′+HidjG.
After sampling nk times we get an (m¯ + 2nk) × nk matrix and parse it as three
matrices X00 ∈ Zm¯×nk, X10 ∈ Znk×nk and X20 ∈ Znk×nk matrices with Gaussian
entries of parameter s. So,
[
A˜i −A˜iRi1 +H1G
]

X00X10
X20

 = A¯′ +HidjG, i.e. [A˜i Ai1 ]

X00X10
X20

 = A¯′ +HidjG.
4. Continue sampling for the cosets obtained from the columns of the matrix Aj1 from
Aj . This time, we increase the Gaussian parameter of the resulting sampled matrix
up to s
√
m¯/2:
[
A˜i −A˜iRi1 +H1G
] X01X11
X21

 = Aj1 , i.e. [A˜i Ai1 ]

X01X11
X21

 = Aj1 .
For the last sampling, to get a correct re-encryption, we will use the cosets which are
formed with the column of the matrix Aj2 + A˜iRi2 −H2G :
[
A˜i −A˜iRi1 +H1G
]

X02X12
X22

 = Aj2 + A˜iRi2 −H2G ,
where X01,X02 ∈ Zm¯×nk, X11,X12,X21,X22 ∈ Znk×nk with entries distributed as
Gaussian with parameter s
√
m¯.
5. Output re-encryption key rki→j =


Im¯×m¯ X00 X01 X02
0 X10 X11 X12
0 X20 X21 X22
0 0 0 Ink×nk

 ∈ Z(m+2nk)×(m+2nk),
which satisfies: Ai · rki→j = Aj.
ReEnc(rki→j, ct) : On input rki→j and i-th user’s ciphertext ct, Compute:
b′t = bt · rki→j = 2st
[
A˜j Aj1 Aj2
]
+ e˜t + (0, 0, encode(m)t), where e˜ = (e˜0, e˜1, e˜2),
e˜0 = (˜¯e0, e˜
′
0) and ˜¯e0 = e¯0, e˜
′
0 = e¯0X00 + e
′
0X10 + e1X20, e˜1 = e¯0X01 + e
′
0X11 + e1X21,
e˜2 = e¯0X02 + e
′
0X12 + e1X22 + e2.
Then output ct′ = b′.
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3.2 Correctness and Security
In this section, we analyze the correctness and security of the proposed scheme.
Theorem 1 (Correctness). The IB-uPRE scheme with parameters proposed in Sec-
tion 3.1 is correct.
Proof. To show that the decryption algorithm outputs a correct plaintext, it is required
to consider both original and re-encrypted ciphertext. The arguments for the original
ciphertext follows from the Lemma 6.2 of [18]. For re-encrypted ciphertext, the main
point is to consider the growth of error due to re-encryption. Argument for the controlled
growth of error of re-encrypted ciphertext follows, with some modifications, from Lemma
15 of [16]. Details calculations are omitted due to space constrained.
Theorem 2 (Security). The above scheme is IND-sID-CPA secure assuming the hard-
ness of decision-LWEq,α′ for α
′ = α/3 ≥ 2√n/q.
Proof. First, using the same technique in [18], we transform the samples from LWE
distribution to what we will need below. Given access to an LWE distribution As,α′ over
Z
n
q ×T, (whereT = R/Z) for any s ∈ Znq , we can transform its samples (a, b = 〈s, a〉/q+e
mod 1) to have the form (a, 2(〈s, a〉 mod q) + e′ mod 2q) for e′ ← DZ,αq, by mapping
b 7→ 2qb+DZ−2qb,s mod 2q, where s2 = (αq)2 − (2α′q)2 ≥ 4n ≥ ηǫ(Z)2, ηǫ is smoothing
parameter [20,18]. This transformation maps the uniform distribution over Znq × T to
the uniform distribution Znq × Z2q. Once the LWE samples are of the desired form,
we construct column-wise matrix A∗ from these samples a and a vector b∗ from the
corresponding b. Let idi∗ be the target user. The proof proceeds in a sequence of games.
Game 0: This is the original IND-sID-CPA game from definition between an attacker A
against scheme and an IND-sID-CPA challenger.
Game 1: In Game1 we change the way that the challenger generates A¯, A¯′,A1,A2 in
the public parameters. In SetUp phase, do as follows:
– Set the public parameter A¯ = A∗, where A∗ is from LWE instance (A∗,b∗) and set
A¯′ = −A∗R−Hidi∗G, where R is chosen in the same way as in Game 0.
– Choose four invertible matrices H1,H2,H3,H4 at uniformly random from Z
n×n
q .
– Choose Ri∗1,Ri∗2 ← D = Dm×nkZ,r ; Set A′1 = −
[
A∗ −A∗R] ·Ri∗1 and
A′2 = −
[
A∗ −A∗R] · Ri∗2; Construct A1 = A′1 − H3Hidi∗G and A2 = A′2 −
H4Hidi∗G.
– Set PP = (A¯, A¯′,A1,A2,H1,H2,H3,H4,G) and send it to the Adversary A.
To answer a secret key query against idi ∈ CU , challenger will do the following: Con-
struct A˜i =
[
A∗ −A∗R−Hidi∗G+HidiG
]
=
[
A∗ −A∗R+ (Hidi −Hidi∗ )G
]
. So, R
is a trapdoor of A˜i with invertible tag (Hidi −Hidi∗ ). Then using Extract algorithm,
challenger gets the secret key skidi =
[
Ri1 Ri2
]
for idi, sends skidi to the adversary A.
Challenger will send ⊥, against the secret key query for idi ∈ HU .
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Note that for idi∗ , A˜i∗ =
[
A∗ −A∗R], so A′1 = −A˜i∗Ri∗1,A′2 = −A˜i∗Ri∗2 and
Ai∗ =
[
A˜i∗ Ai∗1 Ai∗2
]
=
[
A˜i∗ A1 +H3Hidi∗G A2 +H4Hidi∗G
]
=
[
A˜i∗ A
′
1 A
′
2
]
=[
A˜i∗ −A˜i∗Ri∗1 −A˜i∗Ri∗2
]
For the re-encryption key query and re-encryption query, challenger maintain the
restrictions as in definition 5 and computes rki→j, ReEnc(rki→j, ct) according to the
ReKeyGen and ReEnc algorithms to reply the adversary. Due to left-over hash lemma
[1, Lemma 14], (A∗,−A∗R,− [A∗ −A∗R]·Ri∗1,− [A∗ −A∗R] ·Ri∗2) is statistically in-
distinguishable with uniform distribution. Hence, (A∗,−A∗R−Hidi∗G,−
[
A∗ −A∗R] ·
Ri∗1−H3Hidi∗G,−
[
A∗ −A∗R] ·Ri∗2−H4Hidi∗G) is statistically indistinguishable with
uniform distribution. Since A¯, A¯′,A1,A2 and responses to key queries are statistically
close to those in Game 0, Game 0 and Game 1 are statistically indistinguishable.
Game 2: In Game2 we change the way that the challenger generates challenge cipher-
text. Here Challenger will produce the challenge ciphertext b on a message m ∈ {0, 1}nk
for idi∗ as follows: Choose s← Znq and e¯0 ← Dm¯Z,αq as usual, but do not choose e′0, e1, e2.
Let b¯t0 = 2(s
tA∗ mod q)+ e¯t0 mod 2q and b
′
0
t = −b¯t0R+ eˆt0 mod 2q, where eˆ0 ← DnkZ,s′.
So, b0 = (b¯0,b
′
0). The last 2nk coordinates can be set as b
t
1 = −bt0Ri∗1 + eˆt1 mod 2q;
bt2 = −bt0Ri∗2+ eˆt2 + encode(m) mod 2q, where eˆ1, eˆ2 ← DnkZ,s′. Finally, replace b¯0 with
b∗ in all the above expression, where (A∗,b∗) is the LWE instance. Therefore, b¯0
t
= b∗t;
b′0
t = −b∗tR+eˆt0 mod 2q; bt1 = −b∗0tRi∗1+eˆt1 mod 2q; bt2 = −b∗0tRi∗2+eˆt2+encode(m)
mod 2q. Set b∗0
t = (b∗t,−b∗tR+ eˆt0 mod 2q). Then the challenger output the challenge
ciphertext ct = b = (b∗0,b1,b2).
We now show that the distribution of b is within negl(n) statistical distance of that
in Game 1 from the adversary’s view. Clearly, b∗ have essentially the same distribution
as in Game 0 by construction. By substitution we have: b′0
t = 2(st(−A∗R) mod q) +
e¯t0R + eˆ
t
0 mod 2q; b
t
1 = 2(s
t(−A˜i∗Ri∗1) mod q) + (e¯t0, e¯t0R + eˆt0)Ri∗1 + eˆt1 mod 2q;
bt2 = 2(s
t(−A˜i∗Ri∗2) mod q) + (e¯t0, e¯t0R+ eˆt0)Ri∗2 + eˆt2 + encode(m) mod 2q.
By Corollary 3.10 in [22], the noise term e¯t0R+ eˆ
t
0 of b
′
0 is within negl(n) statistical
distance from discrete Gaussian distribution Dnk
Z,s′. The same argument, also, applies for
the noise term of b1,b2. Hence, Game 1 andGame 2 are statistically indistinguishable.
Game 3: Here, we only change how the b∗ component of the challenge ciphertext is cre-
ated, letting it be uniformly random in Zm¯2q. Challenger construct the public parameters,
answer the secret key queries, re-encryption queries and construct the last 3nk coordi-
nates of challenge ciphertext exactly as in Game 2. It follows from the hardness of the
decisional LWEq,α′ that Game 2 and Game 3 are computationally indistinguishable.
Now, by the left-over hash lemma [1, Lemma 14], (A∗,b∗,−A∗R,b∗tR,−A˜i∗Ri∗1,
b∗0
tRi∗1, −A˜i∗Ri∗2, b∗0tRi∗2) is negl(n)-uniform when R,Ri∗1,Ri∗2 are chosen as in Game
2. Therefore, the challenge ciphertext has the same distribution (up to negl(n) statistical
distance) for any encrypted message. So, the advantage of the adversary against the
proposed scheme is same as the advantage of the attacker against decisional LWEq,α′ .
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